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Based on the literature that I used and various documents from 
archives, this project sheds some historic and scientific light on 
Kosova of the period 1960-1970 and the Albania’s stance on the 
developments in Kosova during this period. With the activation 
of the national policy towards Kosova in the early 1960s, 
Albania established an action strategy, which despite being 
ideologically based, was much stronger and more structured. 
This period evidenced a continuation of efforts to expose the 
Yugoslav discriminatory policy against Albanians. Enver 
Hoxha considered that by exposing the Yugoslav policy he 
would manage to diminish the image of Yugoslavia and thus to 
prevent the Yugoslav state from undertaking actions against 
Albanians.  
The demands of Albanians under Yugoslavia for a Republic of 
Kosova were also an issue that was analysed and studied in this 
project. The position of the Albanian state related to the 
demonstrations of 1968 and to the demand for a Republic of 
Kosova is analyzed based on the archive documents of the time. 
Following the demonstrations of 1968, the Yugoslavs addressed 
indirect accusations towards Albania stating that the external 
factor had a hand on these events. By the international 
community Albania was seen as a country that could have 
incited the demonstrations of 1968. The demonstrations of 1968 
had an impact on the relations with the US policy, which 
became more curious in their reflections.    
Albania did not manage to create and clearly state a consistent 
position on the demonstrations of 1968 and the demands that 
were made, despite the huge propaganda it conducted in 
support of the rights of Albanians under Yugoslavia, although 
it seemed to be more reserved about the status of Kosova. The 
Albanian state policy concerning the patriotic national 
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movement was not always consistent, as it became ideological, 
or even controversial in some cases.  
On the other hand, the concept of Kosova independence, with 
elements of a republic in the existing circumstances was 
dominating and the most preferred concept for the majority of 
Kosova Albanians.  
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Albania’s Position on Political Movement in Kosova in 1960s 
 
In the early 1960s Albania was quite active on the Kosova issue. 
Then it had already included the duty of addressing Kosova 
issue as a political platform within the political and state 
institutions. The developments that were taking place in 
Kosova, continuous demands of the underground movement 
addressed to the Albanian state for support, prompted Albania 
to establish an action strategy, which was not so different from 
the ones in the previous years and from ideologcally based 
actions. However, this support now is better structured and 
organized by state authorities. 
Although in a situation of tensioned international relations, 
when the pressure against Albania increased for establishing 
relations and accepting treaties and peace in the Balkans, this 
state remained consistent in its actions dealing with the Kosova 
issue. Now it has changed the form of action, becoming more 
involved in giving instructions, however there is still an open 
criticism to the underground political movement in Kosova, 
and on some occasions we can see that Enver Hoxha made 
mistakes in creating concepts and alliances for resolution to the 
Kosova issue. 
Therefore, this period was characteristic for intensified 
relations between ALP (PPSH) and Albanian political groups in 
the Diaspora and within Kosova. Although relations, 
information and instructing the Albanian political groups and 
organizations in the Diaspora were of a “top secret” character 
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and almost underground, the liaison structures of the Albanian 
state were extended in numerous  fields of work.    
Adjusting to functional task features and applicable norms, 
the sector kept these documents and evidence: files on the 
generated data; regular index of the situation and activities of 
patriotic and revolutionary organizations, necessary documents 
and literature addressing the issue of the Albanians in 
Yugoslavia; information, reports and studies conducted by this 
Sector for the party leadership, etc. 1 
Enver Hoxha considered that by exposing the Yugoslav 
regime policy, through diminishing the Yugoslav image, he 
would manage to prevent the Yugoslav state from undertaking 
activities against the Albanians, and in some cases to make the 
Yugoslav state be more cautious in actions to be undertaken 
regarding Kosova. However, he looked at the resolution to the 
Albanians issue in Yugoslavia from a different angle and in 
different forms of action, which at that time and those 
circumstances, could not be completely accepted by the 
underground political movement in Kosova as their own 
platform.  
In that period, Enver Hoxha thought that “the Kosova issue 
was not an easy one and that it could not be resolved as quickly 
as some Kosovars with good will might think,”2 whereas 
regarding the accomplishment of the objectives for the solution 
to the political status of Kosova, he stated, “it cannot be settled 
because it does not depend on wishes”.3 The war for liberation 
of Kosova and the Albanians in Yugoslavia, according to the 
political platform of the Albanian leadership was a matter 
existing within the  territory of Yugoslavia, as the policy of 
Albania’s leadership was not ready to accept such a war of 
Kosova as it could extend beyond the Yugoslav borders. 
Enver Hoxha wrote, “The people of Kosova should 
understand that under these conditions Albania can never 
attack Yugoslavia. The PRA can never be an aggressor.  
                                                            
1 CAA, p. 10/AP, 1966, file 171. 
2 Ibid, p. 16. 
3 Ibid, p. 16. 
Ethem Çeku 
Thesis Kosova, no. 2, 2009 
24 
However, if Yugoslavia attacked Albania that would be 
something else. Albania shall defend itself, fight and win, and 
then the Kosova problem will be posed on a completely 
different light.”4 
On the issue whether there should be an armed war, Enver 
Hoxha expressed himself to be against it, denouncing it as a 
fatal mistake. “Such a thing can never be successful without 
waiting for a long time before that. Perhaps, neither courage 
nor individual bravery would be sufficient. Revolution is one of 
the most serious issues; therefore it should be well prepared.”5 
The Albanian leadership continued to see the Kosova 
struggle as closely linked to the struggle of other Yugoslav 
peoples and in ‘brotherhood’ with them, since an isolated war 
of Albania against Yugoslavia, according to them, would be a 
suicide.6 According to the Albanian leadership, readiness 
should be there to benefit from any created situation. Firstly, 
the positions in the country should be strengthened regarding 
democratic rights.7 Enver Hoxha thought that the “Albanian 
leadership in Kosova was sold to titoism, therefore they are 
chauvinistic and revisionists and they should not be trusted, 
but their weakest points should be found in order to shake 
them off”8 
It was too illusionary at that time to think that Albanians 
together with other peoples of Yugoslavia and with their 
support could resolve the Kosova issue. They were aware that 
the Yugoslav Federation and its republics at that time had 
managed to overcome their contradictions, and that Tito had 
spread his influence to all the Yugoslav structures and that his 
prestige in the western bloc was high.  
In the respect of propaganda, Albania never stopped its 
activity in criticizing the Yugoslav regime and leadership. In 
some cases, one can see in documents that Enver Hoxha 
addressed harsh criticism also towards the Kosova leadership 
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6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid, p. 19. 
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and asked for feedback about the impact of such criticism on 
relations with the Kosova leadership. He wanted to know how 
close the Kosova leadership was with the federal leadership.9 In 
his ideological war against Yugoslavia, Enver Hoxha also used 
the element of poverty and discriminatory policies applied by 
the Yugoslav Federation towards the economic development of 
Kosova. 
On 16 November 1967, Enver Hoxha wrote an article titled 
“Titoist demagogy cannot cover Kosova’s open wounds”. The 
objective was to expose Titoist demagogy on the aspect of 
economic, political and cultural situation by comparing it with 
the situation in other Yugoslav republics. In 1967, the 
differences between Kosova and other developed areas of 
Yugoslavia grew even bigger. National income of Slovenia was 
7,588 new dinars, whereas in Kosova it was only 730 dinars, as 
much as the Yugoslav annual average.10 Enver Hoxha linked 
this disproportion with the Titoist discriminatory and 
chauvinistic policy and treatment of Kosova solely as a source 
of raw material and as an area for colonial suppression to send 
redundant unskilled forces to Serbia and Montenegro.11 
Enver Hoxha called that a period of “relative peace imposed 
by internal crises and relations established by the Titoist 
regime, while “cultural liberalization” in Kosova as dangerous 
and false manoeuvres, which warned that Titoists were 
instigating a new tragedy for extermination of the Albanian 
nationality”.12 
The Albanian political party and scientific leadership took 
the struggle of the Albanians of Kosova, Montenegro and 
Macedonia under protection, who had “completely the right to 
fight persistently and decisively for the return of all immigrants 
from outside Yugoslavia to the country. They have the legal, 
moral and historic right to demand the return of Serb and 
Montenegrin colonists to their places of origin. They have the 
right to speak and write freely in their mother tongue, to have 
                                                            
9 CAA, pg. 10/ Ap, 1970-1971, file No. 387/1, p. 1. 
10 CAA, p. 10/ Ap, 1967, file No. 19, p. 15. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid, p. 17. 
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their education system, press and literature in Albanian, 
libraries, theatres, studying and cultural institutes for spreading 
their national culture; an administration composed of 
Albanians, elected by the people and not imposed by Titoists. 
They have the right to fight against plunder and exploitation 
and to use their resources for their best interests.”13 
During that period, Enver Hoxha’s official political position 
differed greatly from the position and political platform of the 
underground movement in Kosova. While the latter insisted on 
more advanced modalities and different forms of resolution to 
the problem of Albanians under Yugoslavia, Albania was more 
cautious and requested that the issue at the time to be resolved 
through an extended political autonomy. Thus, according to 
Enver Hoxha, the tasks were limited within the extension of 
democratic rights and a broader autonomy.14 
 
 
Demands for the Republic of Kosova and Albania’s Position 
 
On 27 November 1968, it was for the first time publicly 
demanded in Prishtina and some other towns of Kosova and in 
Macedonia,, that Kosova should become e republic. Apart from 
the main demand for the Republic of Kosova, other demands 
were made at those demonstrations, such as: “We want self-
determination to secession”, “We want unification of the areas 
inhabited by Albanians with Kosova”, “We want a 
Constitution”, “We want a university”, etc.15 
The demonstrations of 1968 also reflected the position of 
Albanians in Macedonia. A document of the Albanian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs writing on this impact stated, “It should be 
said that November and December events of 1968 caused a kind 
of shock among the leadership of Macedonia, and fearing from 
further consequences, they were forced to make some 
compromises. Krste Crvenkovski (the former President of the 
                                                            
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid, p. 19-20. 
15 Kosova Archives, District Court Prishtina, the Verdict against Osman 
Dumoshi and the Members of the YMUA Group, 7 April 1969. 
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Communist League of Macedonia - E.Ç.) and current President 
of Communist League of Macedonia, Angel Cemerski, 
periodically to the political active of Dibra, Tetova and 
Gostivar, were forced to talk about the rights of Albanians in 
Macedonia, such as the rights to their language, flag and 
culture. In Dibra’s Political Active, on 5 October 1970, Angel 
Cemerski, speaking on equality between nations and 
nationalities, was boasted by saying that, “Albanians were 
given extended rights.”16 At this time,  there was a big patriotic 
movement and endeavours among the Albanians in Macedonia 
for unification of Albanians municipalities with Kosova, or at 
least, for Kosova to become the political, economic, educational 
and cultural centre of the Albanians in Yugoslavia.17 Therefore, 
the demonstrations of 1968 forced the policy of Macedonia, 
Montenegro and Serbia and also of the Yugoslav Federation to 
reconsider their policies regarding the Albanians.  
The Yugoslav policy was caught off guard by those events, 
to the extent that the Federation leader, Tito, in a press 
conference with foreign journalists, tried to present those events 
as a simple student movement, similar to the ones in some 
other countries of Europe.18 
Following the demonstrations of 1968, the Yugoslavs 
indirectly made accusations against foreign factors that 
allegedly had a hand in these events. The international factors 
also viewed Albania as a country that could have incited the 
demonstrations of 1968, because of its anti-Yugoslav position 
and for protection of Albanians’ rights in Yugoslavia. That 
document regarding Albania’s influence further reads, 
“Perhaps through such steps like the editorial of “Zëri i 
Popullit” on 24 November, there were harsh condemns for 
“violent suppression”, “unprecedented economic exploitation” 
and “deportations and genocide against Albanian minority. 
                                                            
16 Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1971, file No. 643, p. 14. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Enver Hoxha, Political Diary of Internacional Affairs 1968-1969 (internal use 
only), Tirana, p. 327. 
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These developments made the future of Albanian-Yugoslav 
relations become completely unpredicted.”19 
The demonstrations of 1968 also raised the curiosity of the 
American policy regarding their multidimensional reflections.  
Concerning the Albania’s policy regarding the 
demonstrations of 1968 and the demands made in those 
demonstrations, it did not manage to create or express any 
consistent position. In fact, it made a huge propaganda in 
support of the rights of Albanians in Yugoslavia, such as the 
rights to language, culture, education, human rights, whereas 
regarding the status of Kosova, it seemed to be more reserved. 
Furthermore, in some cases it was unclear and often 
controversial in its positions. 
The Albanian state policy assessed that the events in Kosova 
at that time would be used to destabilize peace in the Balkans 
and to exert possible interference of ‘imperialist’ and ‘social-
imperialist’ states in Yugoslavia, and that interference would 
reflect on the security and sovereignty of Albania. 
In many documents which reflected the Albanian state 
political position, the main issue was what was going to happen 
with the Yugoslav state. If it would be invaded by Russians or 
Americans and what would happen to Albania in such 
circumstances. If its state integrity would be threatened. 
Therefore, even in the important developments, which 
somehow were in favor of resolution of national issue, seemed 
withdrawn and positioned to preserve a status quo. 
On 5 December 1968, Enver Hoxha showed the Albanian 
state position in some notes. Initially he stated that, “In 
Prishtina and many other towns of Kosova there were held 
students demonstrations on 27 November,”20 to continue 
further that “According to official information one person was 
killed21 and many others were wounded by the UDB members, 
who attacked the demonstrators who only were requesting 
                                                            
19 Ibid. 
20 CSA, p. 10/ Ap, 1968, file No. 238, p. 1. 
21 The 17 year-old student Murat Mehmeti from Prishtina was killed at the 
demonstrations of 27 November 1968 in Prishtina. 
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more rights.22 The Yugoslav state considered these 
demonstrations to have been organized by the Albanian youth 
who were considered enemies and inspired from outside.23 
Enver Hoxha, in response to this indirect accusation, continued 
to maintain the line of non-interference into internal affairs of 
Yugoslavia. He wrote, “Naturally, we do not have anything to 
do with these demonstrations, we did not carry on any agency 
or subversive activity either in Yugoslavia or Kosova. Titoists 
know this, but it suits them to slander.”24 He attributed the 
shouting of pro-Albanian slogans to “provocateurs who 
installed themselves among demonstrators to give different 
connotation to the demonstrations.”25 Enver Hoxha expressed 
openly his opinion regarding the Kosova issue as a matter of 
national rights.26 He argued that the position was together with 
Belgrade’s positions towards Greek Macedonians, where “Tito 
stated that it was their right to protect the Macedonians of 
Greece, while Tirana did not have any right to protect the 
Albanian demonstrators and called such protection a crime.”27 
According to the Albanian leadership, these demonstrations 
proved that “Tito-Rankovic’s regime did not manage to crush 
the patriotic movement of Albanians in Yugoslavia with terror 
and oppression. After the fall of Rankovic, Tito had to make 




Hesitation of Albania Regarding the Underground Movement 
Activity in Kosova 
 
Political movements that developed in that period under the 
organization of patriotic forces, with sublime demands, such as 
                                                            
22 CSA, p. 10/ Ap, 1968, file No. 238, p. 1. 
23 Ibid, p. 1-2. 
24 Ibid, p. 2-3. 
25 Ibid, p. 4. 
26 Ibid, p. 4-5. 
27 Ibid, p. 5-6. 
28 CSA, p. 10/ Ap, 1968, file No. 238, p. 8. 
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the demand for a Republic of Kosova, unification of the 
Albanians’ occupied lands in Yugoslavia into one republic and 
for unification of the Albanians’ occupied lands with Albania.29 
The political circles in Albania received such movements with 
hesitation and dilemma about what could happen further, and 
constantly expressed the fear and suspicion whether those 
movements were a conspiracy of Yugoslav secret services or 
reactionary-bourgeois forces.  
This logic of fear was well-founded, since Belgrade had 
already built its structures within Kosova by political 
opponents of the Albanian regime.30 This fact is also based on a 
document that the Albanian legation in Belgrade addressed to 
Albanian state political institutions. The Albanian legation in 
Belgrade had received a request from the Kosova patriotic 
group asking for support of the Albanian state for continuation 
of the struggle for liberation of Kosova, who asked for further 
instructions on how to continue the work and how to behave in 
due time. 
The response that the special Directorate of the Albanian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs returned to the Albanian legation in 
Belgrade read, “Our legation in Belgrade informed us on 
19.09.1968 that Kosovars often showed up, requesting to make 
use of the current situation in the People’s Republic of Albania 
and gave Kosovars comprehensive support to accomplish their 
aspirations for secession from Yugoslavia and unification with 
Albania”.31 The document also states that, “Legation says that 
they do not suspect these people of anythibg, but requests from 
the Ministry to instruct its mission on the position it should 
present to Kosovars, as there are no clear instructions’’.32 “We 
consider,” the response of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said, 
“that the mission comrades do not have the right to trust a priori 
                                                            
29 Mr. Ethem Çeku, Political opinion of undergorund movement in Kosova 1945-1981 
Generation ’81, Prishtina, 2004; Ethem Çeku, The Century of Underground, 
Generation ’81, Prishtina, 2004. 
30 National Archives and Record Administration (NARA), a State Department 
document, 6 July 1953. 
31 CSA, MFA, 1968, File b/7-2/b, No. 360, p. 1-2. 
32 Ibid. 
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Kosovars who come to them with such demands. Therefore, we 
think to convey this message to them: to be vigilant towards 
those who make such demands and to bear in mind that we do 
not have any official territorial claims against Yugoslavia, as we 
do not divide the solution to the Kosova issue from the solution 
to the overall problem of Yugoslavia. This means removing the 
Titoist clique and bringing into power a new Marxist-Leninist 
leadership instead, which, after the resolution of national issue 
in Yugoslavia, would give to the Albanian population the right 
to self-determination with a plebiscite. In this aspect, the 
Albanian population should support occasional Yugoslav 
Marxist-Leninist forces for realization of their objectives.”33 
That document also stated clearly as follows, “Our stance 
towards Yugoslavia and Kosova issue has not changed. We 
advise Kosovars to struggle, as they have been doing until now, 
to get more rights in all aspects, with the objective to enjoy the 
same rights that are enjoyed by other nationalities in 
Yugoslavia.”34 
The above-mentioned document also states, “Regarding 
whether we are for a republic or autonomous province, you 
have the instructions. I repeat that we are not for creating a 
republic, because this would not solve the problem. The 
problem will be resolved only as stated above.”35 
In 1968, Albania in its positions openly expressed the lack of 
readiness to enter into more dynamic movements regarding the 
political status of Kosova. “When visitors, whoever they are, 
ask for our opinion on whether a Republic of Kosova should be 
established or not, you should not let them know our positions, 
but they should be told that it is up to them to decide about 
it.”36 Following this it reads, “In our opinion it is important for 
you to win as many rights as possible and to fight for enjoying 





36 Ibid, p. 1-2. 
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Yugoslavia. For this you have had and will continue to have the 
support of the People’s Republic of Albania.”37 
The official position of the Albanian leadership of that time, 
regarding the national patriotic movement was not always 
consistent and principle-based; in some cases, it was completely 
ideological, sometimes controversial and even contradictious. 
In some cases, it seemed to be more preoccupied in the 
consequences that new political and legal status of Kosova 
would bring, respectively its reflections on the Yugoslav 
Federation with other republics and what direction Yugoslavia 
would take after such dramatic developments in this part of 
Europe.  
Referring to a document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Albania of the time, we quote, “The request for an Autonomous 
Republic of Kosova began to be addressed also through the 
press of the Province, where this request was completely 
justified. Many articles published on this purpose provided 
data and figures on the population in Yugoslav republics and 
their national composition, etc. Hence the question why for 
example Montenegro and Macedonia that have 2.8% and 6.6% 
of the population of Yugoslavia, respectively, and whose 
national composition is 72 % and 71 %, respectively, are 
republics, whereas Kosova that has 5.2 % of the total population 
of Yugoslavia and 74% of it are Albanians is not a republic, but 
an autonomous province.”38 That document further states, 
“These demands of the Albanian people of Kosova, not only 
involve the interests of three Yugoslav republics which are 
bordered with the Province of Kosova, which have within their 
borders vast areas inhabited by Albanian population, but they 
present a threat to the entire federal system of Yugoslavia. 
Therefore, despite all major promises Tito made for Kosova, he 
undertook measures to stop the burst of these demands because 
their accomplishment would also threaten Tito’s position”.39 It 
seems that from that moment, the Albanian government stared 
                                                            
37 Ibid, p. 1-2. 
38 MFAA, 1969, File b/7-2/b, No. 461, p. 2. 
39 Ibid. 
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to be concerned about the implications that the demands of the 
Albanians in Yugoslavia could have in relation to the fate of 
Yugoslav leadership and fragile relations between the Yugoslav 
republics.  
After a careful review of the documents of the time we could 
come to the conclusion that according to the Albanian official 
policy, three political lines were distinguished in Kosova and in 
other Albanians’ areas in Yugoslavia. First, sound patriotic 
forces of the Kosova Albanians, who seeing that their demands 
for establishment of a separate republic and unification of all 
Albanians’ lands within this republic could not be 
accomplished in the existing situation in Yugoslavia , they 
made their greatest efforts through the new Constitution, to get 
as many rights as possible for national equality and get away 
from Serbian dependency.40 Those forces were joined by the 
Kosova leadership, who faithfully served to Tito. The second 
force, who fought for a Province of Kosova and not to get more 
rights than it actually had, were the Serbian-Montenegrin 
chauvinistic forces in Kosova.41 The third force was represented 
by Albanians, who not being able to assess properly the internal 
situation in Yugoslavia, came out openly against the platform 
of the Communist League of Kosova and considered 
insufficient the rights given to the Albanians of Kosova by the 
Constitution.42 Kosova leaders condemned the position of this 
group, and their requests were considered unrealistic and 
tendentious.43 In fact, both the political concepts for an 
autonomy and the concept of Serbs and Montenegrins were 
always minority. The concept of Kosova independence with 
elements of a republic, based on the existing circumstances, was 
in fact the dominant and most desired concept of the Albanian 













The policy of the Albanian state in the early 1960s was in a 
difficult situation, especially after the breaking up the relations 
with the USSR. Albania was politically isolated and its support 
to the Kosova issue was more focused on ideological lines. 
Albania set their tasks to address the Kosova issue as a political 
platform of its state institutions. 
Enver Hoxha, in his political concept, viewed the solution to 
the Kosova issue in the light of ideological reflection . He 
counted on a potential coalition of anti-Titoist political forces in 
Yugoslavia as a whole.  
The general developments in Kosova, continuous demands 
from the underground movements towards Albania for its 
support, forced the Albanian politics to address the issue of 
Kosova.  
That period was characteristic for intensified relations of the 
ALP (PPSH) with Albanian political groups in the Diaspora and 
Kosova. At that time, relations between Albania and Yugoslavia 
were considered as relations with reduced tensions. Enver 
Hoxha tried to use those new relations to influence on the 
political movements in Kosova. He criticized the political 
organization of the underground in Kosova from his ideological 
viewpoint, conveying messages for new forms of activities and 
requesting them to relinquish from slogans like, “War for 
unification with Albania”. Enver Hoxha’s official stance was in 
compliance with the political stance of Kosova Albanian 
officials at the Federal level, for the existence of only one 
Albanian republic, i.e., the Republic of Albania, and regarding 
the Republic of Kosova both parties argued against a second 
Albanian republic. Enver Hoxha and Kosova leadership had 
placed their interests against the interests of the Kosova issue. 
The United States of America followed carefully the 
reflections of demonstrations in 1968. 
Kosova then entered into a new phase of political, legal, 
economic and cultural development. The underground 
movement came out publicly with the demand for a republic. 
The Kosova institutions supported the political position of the 
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underground in the first phase. Albania had a hesitating 
position concerning the demand for a Republic of Kosova. 
Under the political circumstances that were created after the 
intervention of the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia, it suited 
well to Albania to have slow developments concerning the legal 
status of Kosova in the Yugoslav Federation.  
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